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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, ) Case No. 881202-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. ) District Court No. 67,254 
* * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to review the Second Amended Decree of 
Divorce entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court in this 
matter on or about November 23, 1987, is vested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 3 & 4 and Utah 
Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (1988). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Was there sufficient evidence for the Court to 
conclude that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances sufficient to increase the level of child support 
from $190.00 per month to $390.00 per month? 
B. Did the Court err and/or abuse it's discretion by 
considering, in it's Findings of Fact, matters relating to 
property which was owned by appellant prior to his marriage to 
respondent and which were awarded to him in the original decree 
of divorce entered herein? 
C. Did the Court err by failing to rule on the issue of 
income tax exemption and health insurance, both of which issues 
were raised at the time of trial? 
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CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 
The following statutes are relevant to this case: 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children - Court to 
have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and Visita-
tion - Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious 
petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, 
the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and parties. 
The court shall include the following in every 
decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for 
the payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and mainte-
nance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependant children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order deter-
mining child support, an order assigning financial 
responsibility for all or a portion or child care 
expenses incurred on behalf of the defendant children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the 
custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependant 
children would be adequately cared for, it may 
include an order allowing the non-custodial parent 
to provide the day care for the dependant children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the 
custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction 
to make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
78-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(4) "Child11 means a son or daughter under 
the age of 18 years and a son or daughter of 
whatever age who is incapacitated from earning 
a living and without sufficient means. 
. . . 
(8) "Earnings" means compensation paid or 
payable for personal services, whether denominated 
as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, 
and specifically include periodic payment pursuant 
to pension or retirement programs, or insurance Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically 
include all gain derived from capital, from labor, 
or from both combined, including profit gained 
through sale or conversion of capital assets. 
78-45-3. Duty of Man. 
Every man shall support his child; and he shall 
support his wife when she is in need. 
78-45-4. Duty of woman. 
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall 
support her husband when he is in need. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support -
Assessment formula for temporary support. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the 
amount granted by prior court order unless there 
has been a material change of circumstance on the 
part of the obligor or obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a 
material change in circumstances has occurred, the 
court, in determining the amount of prospective 
support, shall consider all relevant factors 
including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of 
the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
(4) In determining the amount of prospective 
support on an ex parte or other motion for temp-
orary support, the court shall use a uniform state-
wide assessment formula, adjusted for regional dif-
ferences, prior to rendering the support order. 
The formula shall provide for all relevant factors 
which can be readily identified and shall allow 
for reasonable deductions from obligor's earnings 
for taxes, work related expenses, and living ex-
penses. The assessment formula shall be established 
by the Department of Social Services and periodi-
cally reviewed by the Judicial Council under Sub-
section 78-3-21 (3). 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
. . . 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
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they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/appellant appeals from the provisions of the 
Second Amended Decree of Divorce governing child support, 
maintenance of health, accident and dental insurance and the 
dependency exemption, which Second Amended Decree was entered 
on November 23, 1987, by the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah, Judge George E. Ballif, presiding. 
On November 23, 1987, over the objections of counsel for 
appellant, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and. Second Amended Decree of Divorce (R. 14 
Si R. 22). Under the provisions of the Second Amended Decree, 
appellant was ordered to increase his monthly child support 
payment from $190.00 per month to $390.00 per month (R. 26). 
In addition, by failing to rule on the issue, the Court 
continued in effect appellant's obligation to pay all medical 
dental, optical and other health care expenses for the minor 
child, and failed to rule on which of the parties ought to 
claim the child as a dependency exemption for tax purposes. 
Appellant was previously married to Cheralee Schumann 
Sherwood, which marriage ended in divorce on or about January 
13, 1983. Pursuant to the decree of divorce entered therein 
appellant was ordered to pay permanent alimony in the sum of 
approximately $450.00 per month (R. 1&2). Said order of 
support remains in full force and effect. 
Subsequently, appellant married respondent herein. The 
parties were married for 45 days. A decree of divorce was Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
entered on or about the 11th day of January, 1985 (R. 5). At 
the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce, respondent was 
pregnant. There was a question as to whether appellant was the 
father of the child, therefore, no obligation for child support 
was assessed, pending a determination of paternity. 
Subsequently it was determined that appellant was the father of 
the child. In April, 19 85, an Amended Decree of Divorce was 
entered, ordering appellant, among other things to pay child 
support in the sum of $190.00 per month (R. 7). On or about 
the 17th day of June, 1987 appellant filed a Petition for 
Modification requesting that the court modify the amended 
decree, to allow appellant specified times of visitation with 
the minor child. Respondent filed a counter-petition 
requesting the court to increase the level of child support 
from $190.00 per month to $450.00 per month, alleging that a 
substantial change of circumstances had occurred since entry of 
the Amended Decree of Divorce in April of 1985. 
At the time of the entry of the Amended Decree of Divorce 
respondent was employed and was earning $3.65 per hour 
(Transcript at 95 L.21). In addition, respondent's 1984 income 
tax return reflected a gross income of $6,444.00, or an average 
gross monthly income of $520.00 (Exh. 35). Respondent's sworn 
affidavit filed with the court on November 16, 1984 claimed 
monthly expenses of $1,462.00 per month (Exh. 6). 
Appellant, in his sworn affidavit at the time of the 
divorce, represented to the Court that he was receiving a 
monthly draw from his accounting business in the amount of 
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$2,349.00 per month, and monthly expenses of $2,706.58 per 
month (Exh. 19). In addition, appellant filed with the court 
his personal financial statement which showed a negative net 
worth of $19,971.95 (Exh. 19). This was the relevant financial 
information before the court in determining the issue of child 
support at the time of entry of the Amended Decree of Divorce. 
Due to the short duration of the marriage, (45 days), the 
court awarded each of the parties those items of property each 
brought into the marriage in addition to any debts and 
obligations owing thereon. In addition appellant was ordered 
to assume all of the marital debts and obligations. 
At the trial on respondent's counter-petition for 
modification, the evidence showed that respondent's gross 
income had increased from $6,444.00 per year at the time of the 
divorce to $17,056.00 per year. (Transcript at P. 99 & 100 LL. 
15-25 & LL. 1-6). Respondent alleged that her living expenses 
for herself and the minor child had increased from $1,462.00 to 
$1,722.00 per month (Exh. 8). 
Appellant testified that his gross income for calendar 
year 1986, which was the most current information available at 
the time of trial, was $14,907.68 (Exh. 16). In addition his 
personal financial statement as of July 21, 1987 reflected a 
negative net worth of $42,534.31 (Exh. 34). Appellant 
attributed the increased negative net worth to a substantial 
reduction in his business income, and the continued necessity 
of having to borrow money to keep his business operating. 
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During cross examination there were substantial 
discrepancies between respondent's representations contained in 
her financial declaration and her actual monthly expenses. In 
her financial declaration respondent alleged that her monthly 
telephone bill was $100.00 (Transcript at P. 108 LL 22-24). In 
court, however, she testified that her basic telephone service 
cost only $24.00 per month. (Transcript at P. 108 L 25 & P. 109 
L 1&2). Respondent alleged that her combined monthly Utah 
Power and Light and Mountain Fuel utilities cost $165.00 per 
month (Transcript P. 110 LL 17-19), whereas respondent's 
returned checks introduced at the time of trial showed a 
combined average monthly cost of $54.00 per month (Transcript 
p.110 LL 21-24). Respondent alleged child care expenses of 
$312.00 per month (Transcript at P. 116 L.21). At the time of 
trial, copies of returned checks introduced into evidence 
indicated monthly child care costs of approximately $90.00 per 
month (Transcript at P. 116 LL 12-19). 
Appellant appeals from the trial court's order increasing 
the level of child support; failing to order respondent to 
maintain health and dental insurance for the minor child; and 
failing to enter a definitive order regarding the dependency 
exemption. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial Court may adjust from time to time, the 
respectivefs parties' obligation for child support upon finding 
that there has been a substantial and material change in 
circumstances. When such a finding is made, the amount of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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support ordered to be paid must not be excessive and must be 
supported by the evidence presented. In this instance the 
trial court abused it's discretion by increasing the level of 
child support for the reason that the court received no 
credible evidence to support the substantial increase in 
support. 
The court erred during it's deliberation about appellant's 
ability to pay child support by considering ownership of 
personal property which he owned prior to his marriage to 
respondent and which had been awarded to appellant in the 
decree of divorce. 
The trial court erred in it's refusal to enter an order on 
the issue of which of the parties ought to be required to 
maintain health and dental insurance for the minor child. The 
evidence at trial was that such insurance was available to 
respondent at no cost, whereas the cost of such insurance to 
appellant was substantial. Furthermore, the court erred in not 
entering an order regarding which of the parties ought to be 
granted the dependency exemption for income tax purposes. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION BY INCREASING 
THE LEVEL OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
The trial Court may adjust from time to time the 
respective parties' obligation for child support upon finding 
that there has been a substantial and material change in 
circumstances. Even when such a finding is made, the amount of 
support ordered to paid must not be excessive and must be 
supported by the evidence. Here the trial abused it's Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discretion by substantially increasing the amount of child 
support when no credible evidence was introduced to support 
it's ruling. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of modification 
of child support orders in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 668 P.2d 561 
(Utah 1983), wherein the court stated that the party 
petitioning the Court for an increase in child support has the 
burden to prove a substantial and material change in 
circumstances since entry of the decree of divorce. 
The evidence introduced at the time of trial was 
insufficient for respondent to meet that burden. The record 
reflects that respondent's income at the time of entry of the 
original decree of divorce, was $6,444.00 per year. (Exh. 35). 
Respondent testified that her income annualized for calendar 
year 1986 was $17,056.00 per year, an increase of $10,612.00, 
or 165%. (Transcript at P.99 & 100 LL 15-25 & LL 1-6). During 
the same period, based upon affidavits filed with the Court, 
respondent's monthly expenses increased from $1,462.00 per 
month to $1,722.00 per month an increase of $260.00 per month, 
or 18%. (Exh. 6 & 8). 
On cross examination respondent testified her itemized 
expenses, including telephone, electrical, gas and child care, 
were substantially overstated. Based on her in court 
testimony, respondent's alleged monthly expenses, considering 
only the four items above, is reduced by $409.00. Furthermore, 
based on respondent's failure to present any documentary 
evidence in court at the time of trial, should make the 
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remaining expense items in her affidavit suspect. During cross 
examination respondent testified as follows (Transcript at P. 
113 & 114, LL. 22-25 & LL 1-4) 
Q. You indicate in this financial declaration 
that your telephone bill was $90.00 a month 
when in fact average service is only $20.00 
a month. What I am getting at quite frankly, 
Miss Sherwood, is that you either made some 
very gross mistakes and errors on the financial 
declaration or you inflated the figures, Now 
which could it be? 
A. I could have made a mistake. 
By comparison, appellant's income at the time of entry of the 
original decree of divorce and the subsequent amended decree of 
divorce was $2,349.00, which represented his "draw" from his 
accounting business (Exh. 19). That draw translates into a 
annual gross income of $28,188.00. Appellant's income for 
calendar year 1986 was $14,907.68, a decrease of $13,281.00 or 
47%. 
The trial court may fashion such equitable orders for 
child support as is reasonable and necessary. In doing so the 
court must consider not only the needs of the child, but also 
the ability of the parent to pay. Anderson v. Anderson, 172 
P.2d 132 (1946). 
The decision of the trial court will be disturbed only 
where the evidence so preponderates against the trial court's 
findings that it appears to be unjust, inequitable, or contrary 
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to the evidence and therefore an abuse of discretion. McBroom 
v. McBroom, 384 P.2d 961, 962 (Utah 1963) (husband and wife 
appeal support and property division); Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 
911, 913 (Utah 1978) (petition to modify decree to increase 
child support). Support awarded must not be excessive, must be 
supported by the evidence, and the basis of the award must be 
reflected in the court's findings. Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2 
435, 437 (Utah 1978); Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P. 2d 864, 865-67 
(Utah 1978). 
It is true that a child's needs increase as he or she gets 
older. However, in this case, a mere two years after entry of 
the original child support order, there is no credible evidence 
supporting additional financial needs for the child. Although 
respondent made certain allegations about increased child 
related costs, she failed to introduce any evidence to justify 
her claim, alleging that she had failed to bring the 
information to court (Transcript at P. 116 & 117 LL 25 & LL 1 & 
2). The burden is on petitioner to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there has been a substantial 
and material change in circumstances. A short advance in age 
alone is not such a substantial change in circumstances as 
would warrant modification of a decree of divorce. Gale vs. 
Gale, 258 P.2d 986 (Utah). 
Both parents have an obligation to support their children. 
Owen vs. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 (Utah). However, that obligation is 
not without limits. A review of the evidence introduced at 
trial shows that although the relative disparity of the 
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parties1 income has changed significantly, it has changed in 
favor of respondent. Gale, 258 P. 2d 986. At the time of the 
divorce, the disparity in income in terms of dollars was 
$21,744.00 in favor of petitioner. At the time of the trial on 
respondent's petition for modification the disparity in the 
parties1 income was $2,149.00. A substantial turnaround, and 
proof of respondent's increased ability to contribute to the 
support of the parties' minor child. A Court's power to modify 
a decree of divorce is not without limit. In this case the 
trial court, and for reason know only to the court, arbitrarily 
ignored the overwhelming evidence. In DeVas vs. Noble, 369 
P.2d 290, (Utah, 1962) our Supreme Court concluded that the 
trial court cannot stubbornly ignore and refuse to be guided by 
credible uncontradicted evidence. The evidence presented by 
appellant is not only the most credible evidence it's 
essentially the only evidence presented at the time of trial. 
During the discovery phase of these proceedings, appellant was 
asked to provide copies of cancelled checks so that appellant 
could verify her monthly expenses. Appellant's response was, 
Plaintiff objects to producing her bank statements 
and checks as they contain personal information which 
is not a proper matter of discovery. (R. 29). 
It was only after a motion to compel was filed that she 
reluctantly supplied some of the documents requested. 
Testimony at the time of the trial, was that in addition 
to his obligation to pay child support to respondent, appellant 
is presently married and his present wife is pregnant. In 
addition he has a continuing alimony obligation from a previous 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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marriage in the amount of approximately $420.00 per month (R. 1 
& 2). The trial court blindly ignored appellant's obligation 
under the previous decree. UCA 78-45-7 provides that in 
determining the amount of prospective support the court shall 
consider in addition to other relevant factors "the 
responsibility of the obligor for the support of others." The 
trial court must recognize appellant's obligation not only to 
support his present family, but the court must also take into 
account his continuing alimony obligation from his first 
marriage. Oppenshaw vs. Oppenshaw, 639 P2d. 177, (Utah). 
In it's Decision dated August 11, 1987 (R. 8), the trial 
court argued that a significant factor in it's decision to 
increase appellant's child support obligation was due to 
appellant's past capacity to borrow money (R. 10). This in 
spite of the fact that appellant testified that he was 
overextended, that most of the borrowed funds were used to 
sustain his business and his present family (Transcript at P. 
14 LL 1 0 - 1 4 ) and that he was in the process of attempting to 
eliminate his debts. Our Utah Supreme Court has never embraced 
the notion that credit, whether good credit or bad credit, 
should ever be a factor in determining a parties' obligation to 
support his or her children. If that were the status of the 
law, many children in this state would be deprived of the 
benefit of support from their parents merely on the basis that 
he or she has "bad credit". That notion would invalidate the 
long standing, position of the courts that a parent's first and 
foremost obligation is to provide support for his or her 
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children, regardless of other obligations. Appellant 
recognized that obligation when he so testified at the trial 
(Partial Transcript at P. 18 & 19, LL 22-25 & LL 1-3). 
UCA 78-45-2(8) defines earnings upon which child support 
shall be based, as follows: 
(8) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable 
for personal services, whether denominated as 
wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, 
and specifically include periodic payment pursuant 
to a pension or retirement programs, or insurance 
policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically 
include all gain derived from capital, from labor, 
or from both combined, including profit gained 
through sale or conversion of capital assets. 
Neither the statute or any case law makes reference to 
"ability to borrow" or "good credit" as a criteria for 
determining child support. Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P. 2d 1019 
(Utah 1987) is analagous to the issue presented in this case. 
In Ebbert plaintiff/appellant appealed a lower court's order 
for child support, arguing that the lower court failed to take 
into consideration the fact that during the marriage, 
defendant/appellant received large gifts of money from his 
parents. In upholding the lower courts ruling that such gifts 
of money should not be considered in determining 
defendant/appellant's obligation to pay child support, this 
court stated, 
Such a consideration would be tantamount to 
imputing the wealth and income of her parents 
to defendant, and thereby imposing a duty of 
child support on the grandparents. Such a 
result is contrary to the concepts of parental 
duty and common sense. The court acted well 
within its discretion in formulating an award 
of child support and we therefore affirm the 
award. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The same reasoning can be applied in this case. For the 
trial court to consider the ability to borrow, or for that fact 
to consider borrowed money in a parties' ability to pay child 
support is contrary to common sense. If the trial court's 
theory is adopted, then the flip side of the trial court's 
argument would suggest that when a party was subsequently 
required to repay the borrowed money, his child support 
obligation would be reduced accordingly. That is patently 
absurd. Appellant's child support obligation should be based 
on the parties' respective gross income or earnings as defined 
by statute, and for the trial court to base it's decision on 
appellant's capacity to borrow money is equally "contrary to 
the concepts of parental duty and common sense.'1 Ebbert, 744 
P.2d 1019. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING APPELLANT'S 
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN DETERMING CHILD SUPPORT. 
The court erred and/or abused it's discretion when in it's 
deliberation and ruling concerning appellant's ability to pay 
an increased amount of child support it considered and ruled on 
matters relating to property owned by appellant prior to his 
marriage to respondent and awarded to him in the original 
decree of divorce. (Transcript of Hearing P. 16 & 17, LL 23-25 
& LL 1-14) 
At the time of entry of the original decree of divorce, 
appellant was awarded certain items of real and personal 
property, all of which he owned prior to his 45 day marriage to 
respondent. The items awarded to appellant at the time of the 
divorce included several horses, a camper, a pickup truck, a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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car and a boat. In it's Decision (R. 11 & 12) and in it's 
Findings of Fact (R. 12), which findings were filed and entered 
over the objection of counsel for appellant, the court, in 
concluding that there had been a substantial change in 
circumstances, placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that 
appellant owned these same items of personal property at the 
time of trial. 
In Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P. 2d 1090 (Utah, 1978), 
in addressing the issue of modification of a decree of divorce, 
the Utah Supreme Court re-stated it's commitment to the 
proposition that for the court to modify an existing decree of 
divorce, the moving party must show a substantial change in 
circumstances. The Court stated, 
This court is clearly committed to the proposition 
that in order to modify a prior decree the 
moving party must show a substantial change 
in circumstances. In the absence of such 
a showing, the decree shall not be modified 
and the matters previously litigated and 
incorporated therein cannot be collaterally 
attacked in face of the doctrine of res judicata. 
McLane v. McLane, 570 P. 2d 692 (Utah, 1972); Porco v. Porco, 
79 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (1988). With the exception of an 
automobile, which appellant was compelled to purchase because 
his previous car blew up (Transcript at P. 137, LL16-21), and 
routine family expenditures, the record is void of any evidence 
showing that appellant has in any way "expanded his life style" 
or "enhanced his standard of living" (R. 12), (Transcript of 
Hearing P. 7 & 3, LL 21-25 & LL 1-3). Yet the court in it's 
written Decision stated, 
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escalating standard of living as shown by heavy 
expenditures in areas such as travel, motor vehicle, 
many purchases with credit lines and loans to himself 
individually and his loans to his business....(R. 10). 
At (R. 12) the court stated, 
. . . and the fact that the defendant has 
continued to increase his standard of living 
and is spending substantial sums for his 
comfort and enjoyment, automobiles, boats, 
travel, etc., and the fact that his adjusted 
gross income has nearly doubled although 
his debts has increased, the court considered 
that there has been a material change of 
circumstance . . . . 
The record does not bear out the conclusions of the court. 
There was no evidence presented to the court of "heavy 
expenditure for travel". The only travel testified to by 
appellant was at (Partial Transcript at P. 29 & 30, LL 25 & LL. 
1-13), where appellant testified he went on his honeymoon with 
his current wife which cost them gas and food and two nights 
lodging in a hotel room. The court further misinterpreted the 
record at trial by concluding that appellant "spent substantial 
sums for his comfort and enjoyment, automobiles, boats, travel, 
etc... There is nothing in the record to substantiate this 
conclusion. The only boat owned by appellant was the one he 
owned prior to his marriage to respondent. The only automobile 
he purchased was the vehicle he purchased because his other 
vehicle blew up. Furthermore, the trial courts conclusion that 
his adjusted gross income nearly doubled is incorrect and 
contrary to the evidence presented at the time of trial. 
Appellant's life style has been substantially reduced due 
to the continued necessity of having to borrow to sustain his 
business as well as his family (Partial Transcript at P. 14, LL 
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10-14). In the Transcript of Hearing on appellants objection 
to findings of fact, the trial court, in attempting to justify 
consideration of personal property previously awarded to 
appellant, recognized it was without legal authority when it 
said, 
I grant you, this is not a run-of-the-mill 
case, and I don't think there is any authority 
for this kind of conclusion that I came to 
when I heard this evidence". 
(Transcript of Hearing, P. 11 LL 3-9) 
The order increasing appellant's obligation for child 
support was based not on the evidence presented in court, but 
rather on the court's belief that appellant's life style or 
standard of living had expanded since entry of the decree of 
divorce. There is nothing on the record, however, to suggest 
that is the case. In interpreting the evidence and in entering 
an Order, the court is not without limits. Carlson v. Carlson, 
584 P. 2d 864 (Utah 1985). Whether the trial court erred in 
it's application of the evidence or abused it's discretion, the 
level of child support ordered in the second amended decree 
should be reduced to $19 0.00 per month, the amount paid by 
appellant pursuant to the amended decree originally entered. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE 
ISSUE OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND TAX EXEMPTION. 
The trial court erred in it's refusal to enter an order on 
the issue of which of the parties ought to be required to 
maintain health and dental insurance for the minor child. 
Furthermore, the trial court erred in it's failure to rule on 
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which of the parties ought to be granted the dependency 
exemption for income tax purposes. 
The trial court has wide discretion in resolving issues 
between the parties in divorce cases. DeRose v. DeRose, 426 P. 
2d 222 (Utah 1967) 
Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all re-
spects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings . . . . 
At the time of trial there was significant testimony on 
the issue of health and dental insurance (Transcript at P. 102 
& 103 LL 4-25 & LL 1-19). Even though the issues were not 
specifically plead, neither counsel for respondent or the court 
raised any objection to the testimony. 
The testimony of respondent was that as a benefit of her 
employment at the Utah Transit Authority, she receives, at no 
cost to her, health and dental insurance for herself and the 
minor child (Transcript at P. 102 L 4). The record further 
shows, that appellant is presently required to maintain 
insurance for the minor child and pay all deductables and 
amounts not covered by insurance, in accordance with the decree 
of divorce, all at a substantial monthly cost to him (R.7). 
During cross examination, respondent testified that the 
only reason she would not put the parties1 child on her medical 
and dental insurance was because it was appellant1s 
responsibility (Transcript at P. 122, L 11). Under the 
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circumstances and due to appellant's current financial 
situation, equity dictates that the court ought to excercise 
it's broad discretion in matters of this nature and order 
respondent to maintain the health and dental insurance as long 
as it is available through her employer, and order the parties' 
to share the deductables. For appellant to be required to 
continue paying for health and dental insurance under these 
circumstances is contrary to the best interest of the parties 
and makes no sense. Therefore, respondent should be ordered to 
secure health and dental insurance for the minor child, and the 
court should enter an appropriate order regarding 
responsibility for deductables not paid by insurance. 
Additionally, the court should rule on the issue of which of 
the parties should be entitled to the dependency exemption for 
tax purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by increasing appellant's child 
support obligation from $190.00 per month to $390.00 per month. 
The trial court's decision is not supported by the evidence and 
respondent has failed to carry her burden of proving a 
substantial change in circumstances. The amount of child 
support ordered was excessive, unfair and inequitable, and 
appellant is without sufficient means to make the payment he 
was ordered to make. 
The trial court failed to rule on the issue of health and 
dental insurance and income tax exemptions for the minor child. 
The evidence shows that respondent has health and dental Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
insurance available to her through her employment at no cost. 
Furthermore, the insurance coverage presently provided by 
appellant was very costly to him. These issues in addition to 
the dependency exemption, were properly raised at the time of 
trial and an appropriate order should be entered. 
Accordingly the decision of Fourth Judicial District Court 
should be either amended as requested herein or vacated and 
remanded to the trial court with specific directions to enter 
an order in accordance with this court's decision on the issues 
presented. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of September, 1988. 
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